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public notice on the union bulletin board suffice? A special set of
problems is encountered when employees, upon receiving notice of
hearing, decide to intervene in the arbitration proceedings. Will this
not cause a substantial delay in the arbitration procedure? Will it not
increase expenses?
GEORGE F. GRAF
United States v. Parke Davis-In a prosecution by the Justice
Department under Sections One and Three of the Sherman Act,' a
conspiracy and combination in restraint of trade by resale price maintenance was alleged. During a period of time when there was no Fair
Trade Law coverage in the District of Columbia or Virginia, Parke
Davis Drug Company distributed a catalogue containing a schedule of
minimum wholesale and retail prices to wholesalers and retailers in
the affected area. Since Parke Davis made it clear that it would refuse
to deal with those who did not adhere to the minimum price schedules,
most of the wholesalers and retailers indicated their willingness to
follow the price policy.
In spite of large profits obtainable under the schedule of minimum
prices, some retailers refused to follow the price policy. One of these
retailers, Dart Drugs, explained that it was forced to cut the prices
of Parke Davis products since a nearby drug store, a member of the
People's Drug chain, was advertising Parke Davis products at reduced
prices. At once Parke Davis took steps to curtail this price-cutting by
People's, which had agreed to observe the stated price lists. The result
of these efforts was an assurance by the vice-president of People's
Drugs that it would abide by the price policy in the future.
Although Parke Davis' efforts were successful with the People's
drug chain, Dart Drugs continued to retail its stock of Parke Davis
products at a discount. Dart and others finally agreed to stop the advertising of cut-rate prices in exchange for the resumption of Parke
Davis shipments. There was evidence that Parke Davis had decreased
its efforts in the ensuing months under greater and greater threat of
prosecution by the Justice Department.
It was held by the United States Supreme Court that there were
facts in the record which were sufficient as a matter of law to show
115 U.S.C. §1, 3: Sec. 1-Every contract, combination in the form of trust or

otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several
States, or with foreign nations is hereby declared to be illegal. . . . Every
person who shall make any contract or engage in any combination or conspiracy, hereby declared to be illegal shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor. . .; Sec. 3-Every contract, combination in form of trust or otherwise,
or conspiracy in restraint of trade or commerce in ... the District of Columbia
and any State or States or foreign nations, is hereby declared to be illegal.
Every person who shall make any such contract or engage in any such combination or conspiracy shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor.
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a conspiracy or combination in restraint of trade for the purpose of
fixing prices. 2 To support its finding that Parke Davis' action had gone
beyond the mere refusal to deal allowed by the Colgate case,3 the Court
pointed out that the wholesalers adopted the Parke Davis plan affirmatively by stating that they would not sell to price-cutting retailers and
by dropping price-cutting retailers from wholesale lists promptly. The
mere announcement of its price policy to the wholesalers by Parke
Davis was not-deemed a violation, but because Parke Davis had obtained the full cooperation of the wholesalers through assurances and
through a system for punishing violators, the Court found a conspiracy
or combination in restraint of trade. 4
The Court examined carefully the means which Parke Davis used
to stop the advertising of its products at cut-rate prices by Dart and
others. There was no simple announcement of a refusal to deal. A
discussion with Dart was had. When Dart agreed to stop its harmful
advertising, this acquiescence was used as a lever to secure the acquiescences of others to stop the advertising of Parke Davis products
at cut-rate prices. This action by Parke Davis indicated to the Court
a policy based upon more than the individual self-interest of every
retailer. The Court found a studied attempt by Parke Davis to secure
adherence to its price line or at least to prevent harmful advertising
of cut-rate prices, which required affirmative assurances from the
parties involved. The Court thus found a conspiracy with the retailers
in restraint of trade in addition to the conspiracy with the wholesalers
which it had previously found.5
The fact that Parke Davis had desisted somewhat from these practices in the months preceding the action was not deemed a defense in
view of the admissions by Parke Davis which seemed to make it clear
that the Company had only desisted under pressure from the Government. United States v. ParkeDavis and Company.6
In a vigorous dissent written by Justice Harlan, the view was expressed that the Court had in fact reversed the Colgate case which had
been the touchstone decision, holding that mere refusal to deal did not
amount to a conspiracy in restraint of trade.7 The Beech Nut s and
Bausch and Lomb9 cases, upon which the majority it was felt, relied
did not represent departures from the Colgate doctrine but rather
instances of true concert of action in *hich no formal agreement had
to be shown. But, the dissent argued, there were no facts in the present
2

United States v. Parke Davis and Co., 80 S. Ct. 503 (1960).

States v. Colgate and Co., 250 U.S. 300 (1919).
United States v. Parke Davis and Co., supra, note 2 at 512.

3United
4

5Id. at 513.
6 Ibid.
7Id. at 514.
8 Beech Nut Packing Co. v. United States, 257 U.S. 441 (1921).
9 United States v. Bausch and Lomb Optical Co., 321 U.S. 707 (1944).
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record sufficient to show this concert of action which must be shown
in the absence of an agreement. Since the finding of the District Court
that no agreement existed, effectively foreclosed any finding by the
United States Supreme Court that an agreement did exist, the dissent
felt that the Court's decision represented a plain departure from the
previous rulings in the area of refusal to deal.' 0
In order to be able to judge the validity of the majority opinion
and the contentions of the dissent, an inquiry into the various decisions
upon which the Court relied may be valuable. Particularly important,
is an inquiry into the question of whether a strong concert of action
must be shown, or whether, as Brennan suggests, only a departure
from the limited dispensation of the Colgate case need be shown to
prove a conspiracy.
In the Doctor Miles case," the United States Supreme Court laid
down the general rule that agreements to maintain retail prices are
illegal per se under the Sherman Act. This opinion was narrowed
somewhat by the opinion in United States v. Colgate Company1 2 in
which the Court held a complaint insufficient to indicate a conspiracy
when the complaint merely alleged attempts by Colgate to maintain
retail prices but failed to allege any agreement. The Court stated the
rule within which all price maintenance plans must stand or fall:
In the absence of any purpose to create or maintain a monopoly, the Act does not restrict the long recognized right of a
trader or manufacturer engaged in an entirely private business,
freely to exercise his own independent discretion as to parties
with whom he will deal, and of course, he may announce in
13
advance the circumstances under which he will refuse to sell.

Unfortunately the rule has been f ound difficult of application by
the courts. Within a short time after the decision in Colgate the Supreme Court was asked to determine whether the Colgate case had
overruled the Dr. Miles doctrine that retail price agreements are illegal
per se. In United States v. Shrader's Sons 4 the Government's prosecution was directed at agreements entered into by a component manufacturer with retailers, jobbers, and manufacturers who sold his products. The trial judge had declared that to draw a distinction between
the action charged in Colgate which seemed to show an implied agreement and the action in the case at hand which showed a written agreement was to make "a distinction without a difference." The Supreme
Court reversed the trial court's decision. It held that Colgate merely
stands for the rule that a manufacturer may announce his prices in
10 United States v. Parke Davis and Co., supra, note 2 at 518.
11 Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park and Sons, 220 U.S. 373 (1911).
12 Supra, note 3 (1919).
13 Id. at 307.
14252 U.S. 85 (1920).
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advance and decline further dealings with those who fail to observe
them, but implied or express agreements to maintain prices are prohibited by the Sherman Act. 15
Frey and Sons Inc. v. Cudahy Packing Company 6 further delineates the scope of the Schrader decision in holding that an implied
agreement found upon the facts from the dealings of the defendants
may constitute a conspiracy in restraint of trade and that no formal
oral or written agreement need be shown. The Supreme Court, however, disapproved of the trial court's broad instruction to the jury."
In Parke Davis, Brennan intimates that today the instruction may be
proper.'8
Perhaps the most important of decisions relied upon in the majority opinion in the Parke Davis case is the case of Beech Nut Packing Company v. United States.'9 Beech Nut had adopted a policy of
refusing to sell its products to wholesalers or retailers who refused
to hold to the Beech Nut price line. The effective enforcement of this
policy required that if wholesalers sold to retailers who cut prices, the
wholesalers also would be refused sales by Beech Nut.
Beech Nut employed a complex system for reporting price-cutters.
Wholesalers and retailers who had knowledge of any price-cutting
cooperated by reporting such practices together with the names of the
price-cutters. A card file was kept by Beech Nut for the purpose of
blacklisting any buyer who cut prices. Before a customer could be
taken off this list he had to give assurances that he would not in the
future violate the Beech Nut price policy. A code number system
which enabled Beech Nut to find out which wholesaler had sold to a
price-cutting retailer was also employed as part of the plan.
The system employed by Beech Nut was enjoined by the United
States Supreme Court.20 The two most damaging elements of the
plan in light of the majority opinion in the Parke Davis case were the
cooperation given by wholesalers and retailers in reporting price-cutters
and the requirement of assurances from a price-cutter that in the
future he would adhere to the price schedules before he could be returned to the approved list kept by Beech Nut. 2 The former seems
25 Id. at 99.
16256 U.S. 208 (1921).
'17Id. at

210.

'8 Supra, note 2 at 510. The instruction is to this effect. If the jury should find
as facts that the defendant "indicated a sales plan to the wholesalers and

jobbers, which plan fixed the price below which the wholesalers and jobbers
were not to sell to retailers, and . . . (that) defendant called this particular
feature of this plan to their attention on very many different occasions, and
... (that) the great majority of them not only (expressed) no dissent from
such plan, but actually (cooperated) in carrying it out by themselves selling
at the prices named .... 256 U.S. 210-211."
19 Supra, note 8.
20 Id. at 455.
2"Supra, note 2 at 511.
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to represent the broad interpretation of a combination in restraint of
trade; the latter seems an example of a type of implied agreement,
even though the Court in the Parke Davis case speaks of conduct
equivalent to an agreement.
United States v. Bausch and Lomb2 2 exemplifies the cooperation
which is struck down so readily by the Court when it is found in the
area of resale price maintenance. In this case a distributor, Soft Lite
Lens Company, offered to its wholesalers a plan by which retail prices
would be set, sales would be limited, and the approval of retail
licensees would be accomplished by the cooperation of the distributor
and the wholesalers. This "package" which the distributor defended
on the ground that it was necessary in order to protect good will was
termed a violation of the Sherman Act by the United States Supreme
Court. The Court found that the cooperation between the distributor
and its wholesalers in selecting a limited number of licensees and in
agreeing upon the qualifications of retailers who were to market the
lenses, was tied closely to the retail price lists provided the wholesalers,
and thus a combination to maintain prices in violation of the Sherman
Act could be found upon the facts. 23 The Court rejected the defense
of good will, stating that such was 24not a valid defense in view of the
per se nature of the violation found.
From the decisions above and from decisions in proceedings before
the Federal Trade Commission, certain conclusions can be drawn.2 5
1. The attempt to fix prices by contract, combination, or conspiracy is a per se violation of the Sherman Act and no defense of
Supra, note 9.
23d. at 723
24 Ibid.
25 Decisions before the Federal Trade Commission seem to give added force to
Brennan's statement that Colgate gives only a limited dispensation to a distributor to refuse to deal. In the cases cited below the actions described were
enjoined. J. W. Kobie Co. v. F.T.C., 23 F. 2d 41 (2d Cir. 1927) (Defendant
solicited the aid of customers t9 report the names of price cutters); Cream
of Wheat v. F.T.C., 14 F. 2d 40 (8th Cir. 1926) (The defendant:
1. sought prior assurances that customers would maintain prices and cooperate to secure observance by others,
2. solicited information and reports as to price cutting,
3. notified customers as to persons cutting prices and required customers
not to sell to them,
4. charged higher prices to those who had cut prices.);
Hills Bros. v. F.T.C., 9 F. 2d 481 (9th Cir. 1926) (The defendant requested
dealers to report price cutters and requested assurances of future price observance from dealers charged ,with price cutting.); Moir et al. v. F.T.C., 12
F. 2d 22 (1st Cir. 1926) (Prior assurances were received and requests were
made to dealers to report price cutters.) ; Q.R.S. Music Co. v. F.T.C., 12 F.
2d 730 (7th Cir. 1926) (The same type of assurances and cooperation as in
the Hills Bros. case were given.) ; Shakespeare Co. v. F.T.C., 80 F. 2d 358
(6th Cir. 1931) (Assurances given as to future acquiescence in the policy.) ;
Toledo Pipe Threading Machine Co. v. F.T.C., 11 F. 2d 337 (6th Cir. 1926)
(Assurances were given as to future action.).
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insubstantiality or requirement to protect good will can be
made.26
2. Any cooperation from wholesalers or retailers in the form of
distributing price lists, or reporting price-cutters will not be
2
allowed. 7
3. Any assurances exacted by the distributor from retailers or
wholesalers will probably be regarded as equivalent to implied
28
contracts and thus violative of the Sherman Act.
4. When a price policy based upon refusal to deal is acquiesced in
by a buyer holding an exclusive dealership from a producer or
distributor of goods, the courts will probably find cooperation
29
in maintaining the prices of goods.
5. In the absence of an attempt to monopolize, a manufacturer has
the right to refuse to deal with any customers who do not adhere to his price line. However, when he tries to enforce this
price policy by methods other than the reliance upon individual
self-interest to bring about general acquiescence in a policy which
has the effect of eliminating price competition, he is acting in
30
violation of the Sherman Act.
It seems clear, if these conclusions are correct, that a manufacturer
will only succeed in holding buyers to a price line when they are themselves disposed to follow it. Perhaps the producer can protect himself
somewhat by choosing wholesalers and retailers to whom he will sell
on the basis of past performance in adhering to such plans, but if a
general failure to adhere to the price lists occurs, such as Parke Davis
experienced, this would probably portend the breakdown of the whole
system since the methods which Parke Davis employed to maintain
its price line are no longer permitted.
ROBERT G. ULIRCH

i6 United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 at 223; United States
v. Bausch and Lomb Optical Co., supra, note 9.
27 United States v. Parke Davis and Co., supra, note 2 at 512-513.
28 Ibid.
29
United States v. Bausch and Lomb Optical Co., supra, note 9 at 723.
3

United States v. Colgate, supra, note 3 at 307; United States v. Parke Davis
and Co., supra, note 2.

